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Abstract
Pari-mutuel markets are trading platforms through which the common market maker simultane-
ously clears multiple contingent claims markets. This market has several distinctive properties
that began attracting the attention of the financial industry in the 2000s. For example, the plat-
form aggregates liquidity from the individual contingent claims market into the common pool while
shielding the market maker from potential financial loss. The contribution of this paper is two-fold.
First, we provide a new economic interpretation of the market-clearing strategy of a pari-mutuel
market that is well known in the literature. The pari-mutuel auctioneer is shown to be equivalent to
the market maker with extreme ambiguity aversion for the future contingent event. Second, based
on this theoretical understanding, we present a new market-clearing algorithm called the Knight-
ian Pari-mutuel Mechanism (KPM). The KPM retains many interesting properties of pari-mutuel
markets while explicitly controlling for the market maker’s ambiguity aversion. In addition, the
KPM is computationally efficient in that it is solvable in polynomial time.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we design a new platform for trading contingent claims, the Knightian Pari-mutuel
Mechanism.
The term ”pari-mutuel” originates from the automated horse race betting system invented in
the 19th century. The pari-mutuel betting system automatically calculates payoff odds for each
horse based on the amount of money bet on each horse. It also completely shields the market
organizer from financial loss. To illustrate, suppose that people wager their money on the outcome
of a race between two horses: A and B. People wager a total of $50 on Horse A and $100 on Horse
B. The total premium of $150 is paid to those who correctly predicted the outcome. Thus, if Horse
A wins, those who wagered money on Horse A receive $3 for each dollar they wagered. If Horse B
wins, the winners make $1.5 for each dollar they wagered. Because the payment to the winners is
financed exclusively by the fees collected from both winners and losers, the market maker does not
need to worry about his/her loss. This is called the self-financing property of the market.
The rate of return from wagering on a particular horse conveys information on the collective
perception of that horse’s chances of winning. Consider the example above. Wagering on Horse
B yields a lower rate of return than wagering on Horse A because people wagered more money
on Horse B than on Horse A. The more money people wager on a particular horse the lower the
rate of return becomes. People bet money on a horse if they believe that horse is likely to win the
race. Thus, the rate of return from wagering money on a horse is low if many people believe that
the horse will win the race. The pari-mutuel system maps the popularity of horses to the rates of
return from wagering money on those horses.
This simple pari-mutuel system subsequently evolved into more sophisticated prediction mar-
kets. For example, more recently developed markets (Peters et al., 2005; Peters et al., 2007) trade
securities with fixed final payoffs. The prices of those securities fluctuate in a way that reflects
their popularity in the market.
Despite considerable heterogeneity across various prediction markets, they typically exhibit
three defining characteristics. First, the popularity of a particular security is mapped to a higher
price of that security through an automated market-clearing algorithm. Second, the market maker’s
maximum possible loss at maturity is bounded. Irrespective of the outcome at the time when
contingent claims mature, the market maker is not expected to lose more than a certain pre-
specified amount. In this paper, when we say that the market is completely pari-mutuel, we mean
1
that the market maker is not expected to lose money, regardless of the outcome.
Finally, the market aggregates liquidity across different markets into the common pool (Baron
and Lange, 2007). For example, consider the horse race example above but with a slight modifica-
tion. Suppose that people trade securities with fixed payoffs: Claim A and Claim B. Let ”Claim
A” refer to the contingent claim that pays $1 if and only if Horse A wins. Define the term ”Claim
B” similarly. The potential payout to the holders of Claim A is financed by the premiums collected
from the holders of Claim B and vice versa. Therefore, it is as if the holders of Claim A and those
of Claim B were transacting with one another via a common pari-mutuel auctioneer. Compare
this case with an alternative situation in which potential buyers of Claim A (or Claim B) only
trade with potential sellers of Claim A (or Claim B). The effective number of people trading with
one another is larger in the former case. It is as if the common auctioneer pooled liquidity from
individual markets - the market for Claim A and the market for Claim B - into the common pool.
As a result, market participants can enjoy a more liquid market.
In the 2000s, researchers (Lange and Economide, 2005; Baron and Lange, 2007) noted that the
pari-mutuel principle can be used to better organize a certain type of financial derivatives market.
For example, note that the pari-mutuel auctioneer is well protected from financial loss at the
time the claims mature. This property of the pari-mutuel market allows the auctioneer to be less
concerned with fluctuations in the value of the inventory. Therefore, the pari-mutuel principle can
be used to design a market if the market maker has difficulty hedging against inventory risk (Lange
and Economide, 2005; Baron and Lange, 2007). For example, Lange and Economide (2005) designed
the Pari-mutuel Digital Call Auction (PDCA) to trade options written on economic indices, for
which delta hedging using the underlying asset is not feasible.
Longitude, a financial technology company, developed software to implement the PDCA. In
collaboration with investment banks (e.g., Goldman Sachs) and financial exchanges (e.g., the In-
ternational Securities Exchange (ISE)) new PDCA-based derivatives markets were launched. Due
to lack of active market participation, the ISE shut down the auction in June 2007. However, the
ISE has shown consistent interest in utilizing this technology in the near future (Burne, 2013).
Despite their use in the financial industry, many pari-mutuel auctions have design features
that are different from the modeling assumptions that economists use. A potential reason for this
is that pari-mutuel auctions have primarily been studied by scholars in operations research. For
example, many pari-mutuel auctions optimally clear the market while placing a lower bound on
the auctioneer’s maximum possible loss (Hanson, 2003; Pennock, 2004; Peters et al., 2005; Lange
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and Economide, 2005; Chen and Pennock, 2007; Peters et al., 2007; Abernethy et al., 2013). The
worst-case scenario can have a material impact on how the auctioneer clears the market even if
such a scenario is very unlikely. In contrast, the market maker in the economists’ model is often
exclusively concerned with maximizing his/her expected utility derived from the monetary payoff.
When only the expected value of the future utility is concerned, extreme worst-case loss with a
small probability of occurrence does not merit considerable attention.
The contribution of our paper is two-fold. First, we present a theoretical framework through
which pari-mutuel auctions can be reconciled with standard economic models. Regarding the
economics model, we focus on a market maker with extreme ambiguity aversion for the future
contingent event on which claims are written. The decision maker with ambiguity aversion is
uncertain of which probability distribution accurately describes the contingent event. For a pari-
mutuel market, we consider the Convex Pari-mutuel Call Auction Mechanism (Peters et al., 2005),
which is an improved version of the PDCA. We show that the market-clearing strategy of the
market maker with extreme ambiguity aversion is asymptotically equivalent to that of the CPCAM
auctioneer. By asymptotic equivalence, we imply making the CPCAM increasingly completely
pari-mutuel.1
Second, based on this unified theoretical framework, we design a new market called the Knigh-
tian Pari-mutuel Mechanism (KPM). The KPM has a solid microeconomic rationale behind its
design. We derive the optimization problem of the KPM by modeling the market maker using the
theory of decision making under ambiguity aversion. The market-clearing algorithm explicitly con-
trols for the level of the market maker’s ambiguity aversion. In addition, we propose an algorithm
that can compute an optimal solution to the optimization problem in polynomial time.
1.1 Literature Review
In the prediction market literature, the KPM is most similar to Chen and Pennock’s utility-based
market maker (Chen and Pennock, 2007). The utility-based market maker prices contingent claims
1In the CPCAM, before the beginning of the regular trading session, the initial liquidity provider seeds the market
with small initial orders. This initial order, which is typically called the starting order, is a unique design feature of
the CPCAM. The starting order is introduced into the CPCAM only to ensure the existence of unique state prices,
which are used to compute the market-clearing prices of contingent claims. However, the starting order exposes
the market organizer to a financial loss at the time the claims mature. The larger the starting order, the greater
the potential financial loss of the market maker. By asymptotic equivalence, I mean reducing the magnitude of the
starting order toward zero. When the starting orders are infinitely small, the market-clearing strategy of the CPCAM
auctioneer approaches that of the ambiguity-averse market maker.
In addition, I assume that the market organizer submits the same starting order for all possible states of the future.
I describe what the starting order is in later sections.
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in such a way that the transaction leaves the market maker’s expected utility over the future mon-
etary payoff unaffected. Agrawal et al. (2011) suggests an improvement of Chen and Pennock’s
(2007) market. The market maker may find it difficult to propose a unique probability distribu-
tion to describe the event for which the claims are written. The KPM addresses Agrawal et al.
(2011)’s suggestion: It allows the market maker to indicate a set of multiple reasonable probability
distributions instead of a single distribution. The KPM acknowledges that the market maker often
cannot pin down a single subjective probability distribution.
Our paper is related to the recent literature that explains a wide variety of prediction markets
from a unified theoretical perspective. The most notable work in this respect is Agrawal et al.
(2011). They show that the four most well-known prediction markets in the literature can be
unified under one theoretical framework. In a similar vein, we reconcile pari-mutuel mechanisms
from the prediction market literature with the model from the economics literature.
My paper is related to a growing body of literature that focuses on the role of Knightian
uncertainty in decision making. In the past decade, Knightian uncertainty has received a significant
amount of attention in areas ranging from macroeconomic modeling (Hansen and Sargent, 2008)
to market microstructure theory (Easley and O’Hara, 2009; Easley and O’Hara, 2010).
2 The Theory of Decision Making under Ambiguity
We present a brief overview of the theory of decision making under ambiguity. First, it is necessary
to distinguish between risk and ambiguity. Risk applies to situations in which it is possible to attach
a probability distribution to an unknown prospect. By contrast, ambiguity refers to situations in
which it is impossible to do so. For example, consider a situation in which a person receives a dollar
if and only if he/she draws a red ball from a box. The box contains both red balls and blue balls.
If the person knows the fraction of balls that are red, he/she knows the probability of receiving
a dollar. In this case, the person is said to be facing risk. On the other hand, suppose that the
person does not know the fraction of balls in the box that are red. Then, the person cannot assign
a number to the probability of winning a dollar. This person is said to be facing ambiguity. In the
1920s, Knight was the first to note the difference between these two concepts (Knight, 1936).
An ambiguous prospect requires a different analysis from that of a risky prospect. To this
end, Theorem 1 reproduces the main finding of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) in the language of
Ghirardato et al. (2004). Let S denote the set of all possible states (e.g., the person chooses a red
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ball, the person chooses a blue ball), and let X denote the set of consequences (e.g., the person
wins a dollar). Subsets of S are called events. Let Σ denote the algebra of subsets of the state space
X. We are interested in the decision maker’s preference over different simple acts: A simple act is
a Σ-measurable function f : S −→ X that is finite-valued (Ghirardato e al, 2004). Let F denote
the set of all simple acts. Suppose that the binary relations < and ≻ characterize the decision
maker’s preference over different acts: f < (≻)g if and only if the decision maker (strictly) prefers
the simple act f to the simple act g. Finally, let u : X → R denote the decision maker’s utility
function.
Theorem 1 (Decision Making under Ambiguity) (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Ghi-
rardato et al., 2004) The decision maker’s preference relation < satisfies the set of six behavioral
axioms2 if and only if there exists a unique set Ψ of probabilities on (S,Σ) such that (1) holds for
∀f, g ∈ F . The set Ψ is weakly compact, convex and nonempty.3
f < g ⇔ min
P∈Ψ
∫
u(f)dP ≥ min
P∈Ψ
∫
u(g)dP (1)
Proof. See Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) or Ghirardato et al. (2004).
The set of probabilities Ψ in Theorem 1 encapsulates the decision maker’s (hereafter called the
DM) perception of ambiguity (Ghirardato et al., 2004). Recall that a DM facing ambiguity cannot
attach a single probability distribution to the unknown prospect. Instead, the DM has a set of
candidates Ψ that he/she believes are fairly accurate predictions of the future (Ghirardato et al.,
2004). In other words, the DM has a set of multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). The size
of Ψ represents the extent to which the DM feels ambiguous toward the unrealized future outcome
(Ghirardato et al., 2004). A large size of Ψ implies that the DM cannot easily narrow down the set
of reasonable probability distributions because he/she is too ambiguous about the future outcome
(Ghirardato et al., 2004).
Among the set of multiple priors, the DM is exclusively concerned with the worst possible
scenario. First, for each P ∈ Ψ, the DM calculates the expected utility
∫
u(f)dP from the unknown
prospect assuming that P is the true description of the future. Second, the DM finds the distribution
that results in the lowest level of utility. Third, when comparing one act with another, the DM
2Please see Ghirardato et al. (2004) for the set of six behavioral axioms.
3Ghirardato et al. (2004) presents three different versions of the theorem depending on the DM’s attitude toward
ambiguity. However, we only work with the version that assumes aversion to ambiguity. Please refer to Ghirardato
et al. (2004) for a more rigorous formal definition of aversion to ambiguity.
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uses the probability distribution associated with the worst scenario. The DM chooses the act whose
worst-case scenario is better than the worst-case scenarios of the other acts. See the Appendix for
a numerical example.
In practical modeling and implementation, the specification of the set Ψ of the DM becomes
another issue. Hansen and Sargent (2008) presents a useful solution in the context of modeling in
macroeconomics. We first introduce Kullback’s cross-entropy function (Cover and Thomas, 2012)
to quantify the extent to which two probability distributions differ from one another.
Definition 1 (Kullback’s Cross-Entropy Function) Suppose that there are two probability
distributions p and q with the common support set S. Suppose that q is the prior density over the
set S. Then, the Kullback’s cross-entropy function is defined as (2) (Cover and Thomas, 2012). A
large value of S(p, q) implies that p and q are very different from one another.
S(p, q) =
∫
S
p(x) ln
[
p(x)
q(x)
]
dx (2)
Hansen and Sargent (2008) use cross-entropy to restrict the set of probability distributions
considered by the DM. Given the prior distribution q and a parameter η, the DM’s set Π includes
all probability distributions p for which S(p, q) ≤ η. As long as the probability distributions are
not too different from p, in which case S(p, q) > η, the DM considers those probability distributions
to be equally acceptable.
A large value of the parameter η quantifies the DM’s strong ambiguity aversion.4 With a larger
value of η, the DM regards a larger set of probability distributions as candidates for accurate
descriptions of the world. Hence, a large η is equivalent to saying that the DM is more ambiguous
about the real world.
3 The Microeconomic Analysis of the Convex Pari-mutuel Call
Auction Mechanism (CPCAM)
3.1 The Market Setting
The CPCAM allows the common market maker to simultaneously handle different types of contin-
gent claims as long as the claims are written on the same uncertain event (e.g., the outcome of the
4Illeditsch (2011) also uses the size of the set of possible models under the DM’s consideration as a proxy for the
DM’s level of ambiguity aversion.
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world cup, stock prices). Suppose that there are N possible outcomes of the uncertain event, each
of which is indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
The CPCAM is a call auction. For simplicity, only buy orders are accepted. Suppose that the
market participants as a whole submit J orders to the market maker. Let the matrix A ∈ RN×J
denote the payoff structure of J orders. The (i, j) element of A denotes the per-share payoff of the
jth order, where j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J} if the ith outcome is realized. Define the vector b ∈ RJ such that
the jth element of this vector is the limit price associated with the jth order. Define the vector
Q ∈ RJ such that its jth element is the limit quantity for the jth order.
δ ∈ RN denotes the starting order. The starting order is a unique feature of pari-mutuel auctions
(Lange and Economide, 2005; Peters et al., 2005). Before regular traders submit their orders, the
market organizer seeds the market with the starting order δ. For each i, the organizer purchases δi
dollars’ worth of the Arrow-Debreu security that pays $1 per share if and only if the ith outcome
is realized. Arrow-Debreu securities are introduced only for the starting order and thus are not
traded in the regular trading session. Let ”the ith Arrow-Debreu security” refer to the one that
pays $1 per share if and only if the ith event is realized. At this point, the organizer does not
know the number of shares of Arrow-Debreu securities he/she owns because those securities are
not yet priced. The prices of Arrow-Debreu securities are determined only when the markets are
cleared at the end of the regular trading session. The number of the ith Arrow-Debreu security
the organizer holds is determined by dividing δi by the price of that security. Then, the auctioneer
pays the market organizer just like any other trader. The starting orders are included in the model
to ensure that the market clearing optimization problem yields a unique set of prices for contingent
claims (Lange and Economide, 2005; Peters et al., 2005).
Equation (3) is the CPCAM. Let ε ∈ RN denote the vector of state prices: The ith element of
ε is the state price for the ith outcome. εi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint∑J
j=1Ai,jxj + si =M . The state prices are the building blocks on the basis of which all contingent
claims traded on this market are priced. For example, the market-clearing price for the contingent
claim with the payoff structure A·j is A
T
·jε. s∈ R
N and M are dummy variables. x ∈ RJ is the
vector of order fills. For example, the jth element of x is the number of shares of the claim that
the submitter of the jth order is allowed to purchase.
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max
x,s,M
bTx−M +
∑N
i=1 δi log(si)
such that
(A)
∑J
j=1Ai,jxj + si =M for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}
(B) 0 ≤ x ≤ Q
(C) s ≥ 0
(3)
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality condition for (3) implies the limit order logic (4)
for each j. The market maker can exercise his/her discretion if the bid price is exactly equal to the
market-clearing price of the order.
xj = 0 if A
T
·jε > bj
xj ∈ [0, Qj ] if A
T
·jε = bj
xj = Qj if A
T
·jε < bj
(4)
The person who submitted the jth order pays the premium worth bjxj to the market maker. If
the ith outcome is realized, the market maker pays the person Aijxj.
The
∑N
i=1 δi log(si) term ensures the existence of a unique state price vector. However, the
starting order subjects the market organizer to potential financial loss when the claims mature. To
minimize organizer’s potential loss, Peters et al. (2005) suggest making the magnitude of δ very
small.
3.2 Equivalence with the Ambiguity-Averse Market Maker
Let u : R→ R denote the market maker’s utility function. Suppose that u is an increasing function.
Unlike Peters et al. (2005), we suppose that the market maker uses the uniform starting order.
That is, δi is the same constant δ for ∀i. Let ε(δ) denote the state price vector associated with (3)
when δi = δ for ∀i. Let x(δ) denote an optimal value of x for (3).
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Theorem 2 As δ → 0, x(δ) converges to an optimal solution for (5).
max
x
min
p
N∑
i=1
piu
[
bTx−
∑J
j=1Ai,jxj
]
such that
(A’) 0 ≤ x ≤ Q
(B’) p ≥ 0,
∑N
i=1 pi = 1
(5)
Proof. See the Appendix.
(5) is an optimization problem to which (6) converges as the value of Ω increases to infinity.
max
x
min
p∈Ψ
N∑
i=1
piu
[
bTx−
∑J
j=1Ai,jxj
]
such that
(A’) 0 ≤ x ≤ Q
(B’) p ≥ 0,
∑N
i=1 pi = 1
(C’) Ψ =
{
p ∈ RN×1|p ≥ 0,
∑N
i=1 pi = 1,
∑N
i=1 pi ln
(
pi
qi
)
≤ Ω
}
(6)
(6) is the optimization problem that the market maker should be solving if the market maker’s
decision-making process obeys the theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) or Ghirardato et al.
(2004). bTx is the total premium that the market maker collects from the traders.
∑J
j=1Ai,jxj is
what the market maker has to pay to traders if the ith outcome is realized.
N∑
i=1
piu
[
bTx−
∑J
j=1Ai,jxj
]
is thus the expected utility for the market maker. The vector q ∈ RN is the pivot prior probability
distribution. The market maker considers any probability distribution p reasonable as long as the
Kullback-Leibler distance between p and q is not greater than Ω.
Therefore, (5) is an optimization problem that the market maker solves if he/she is a DM with
extreme Knightian ambiguity aversion. In Theorem 2, we show that the market-clearing order fill
of the CPCAM is an optimal market-clearing strategy of a market maker with extreme ambiguity
aversion.
Our result may be relevant to other pari-mutuel markets because the CPCAM is closely related
to other pari-mutuel markets. First, the CPCAM is an improved version of the PDCA. Peters et al.
(2005) developed the CPCAM to make the optimization problem convex. However, the CPCAM
and the PDCA still yield the same equilibrium price.
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Second, Agrawal et al. (2011) show that many important pari-mutuel markets in the literature
(e.g., the Market Scoring Rule mechanism, cost-function based market makers, utility-based market
makers, and the Sequential Convex Pari-mutuel Mechanism) can be understood under a common
theoretical framework. The Sequential Convex Pari-mutuel Mechanism (SCPM) (Peters et al.,
2007) is one of the pari-mutuel markets that Agrawal et al. (2011) analyze. In addition, the
CPCAM and the SCPM are very closely related to one another. The only major difference is that
the CPCAM is a call auction and the SCPM is a continuous market. Therefore, the CPCAM
and other important pari-mutuel markets are closely related to one another. Given this close
relationship between different market designs, our analysis of the CPCAM may also apply to other
pari-mutuel markets. However, we leave that extension to future work.
4 The Knightian Pari-mutuel Mechanism (KPM)
In this section, we design a new market called the Knightian Pari-mutuel Mechanism (KPM).
4.1 The Market Setting
The limit order logic and the basic trading environment are similar to those of the PDCA (Lange
and Economide, 2005). However, the algorithm through which the market maker clears the market
is original. In particular, the probabilistic treatment of the market maker’s optimization problem
is original.
Like the CPCAM, the KPM allows the common market maker to handle multiple types of
contingent claims written on the same random event. There are N possible states of the uncertain
event, each of which is indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
The KPM allows traders to submit both market orders and limit orders. Traders can submit
market orders just as if they were submitting limit orders simply by making the limit price extremely
high or low. Therefore, throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that people trade only limit
orders. When submitting each limit order, the trader indicates the limit price, the limit quantity,
and if the order is a buy or a sell.
For the sake of simplicity, we describe the setting in which the market is run as a call auction.
However, the setting can be easily adjusted to accommodate continuous trading in the same manner
as the CPCAM (Peters et al., 2005) is changed to the SCPM (Peters et al., 2007).
Suppose there is a total of J limit orders outstanding in the limit order book. Let the matrix
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A ∈ RN×J represent the payoff structure of those orders. The column matrix A·j∈ R
N×1 is the
payoff structure of the contingent claim that the jth order attempts to transact. For example,
suppose that the second order attempts to buy three shares of the contingent claim that pays $1 per
share if and only if state 1 is realized. In such a case, the column matrix A·2 is
[
1 0 0 ... 0
]T
.
When determining the market equilibrium price of each order, the market maker first determines
the equilibrium price for each state. Let ξ =
[
ξ1 ξ2 ... ξN
]T
denote the equilibrium state
prices. Then, the market maker determines the market-clearing price of each contingent claim by
taking the dot product between the payoff vector and ξ. For example, consider the contingent
claim with payoff structure
[
1 0 1 0
]T
. Suppose that the equilibrium state price vector ξ is[
ξ1 ξ2 ξ3 ξ4
]T
. Then, the market-clearing price of this contingent claim is ξ1+ξ3. Therefore,
to determine the equilibrium price of each order in the limit order book, the market maker only
has to determine the value of ξ.
The binary variable Bj is 1 if the jth limit order is a buy order and −1 if the jth limit order
is a sell order. Let bj and Qj denote the limit price and the limit quantity associated with the jth
order, respectively. Let xj denote the actual number of the shares of the claim that the submitter
of the jth order is allowed to trade. We call xj the ”order fill” for the jth order.
Once the equilibrium price of each order is determined, the market maker decides xj, ∀j ac-
cording to the limit order logic. Consider a buy order. If the market-clearing price of an order is
strictly higher than the limit price, xj is exactly equal to 0. If the market-clearing price is strictly
lower than the limit price, xj is set to Q. In these two cases, the limit order logic automatically
determines the order fill. In contrast, if the market-clearing price of an order is exactly equal to
the limit price, the value of xj can be any number in the closed interval [0, Qj ]. The logic works
similarly for a sell order. Define the vector x ∈ RJ×1 such that the jth element of x is xj. Similarly,
define Q ∈ RJ×1 such that the jth element of Q is Qj. Define b ∈ R
J×1 such that the jth element
of b is bj.
Definition 2 (Limit Order Logic)
N∑
i=1
Aijξi is the market-clearing price of the jth order.
xj = 0 if
N∑
i=1
Aijξi > Bjbj
xj ∈ [0, Qj ] if
N∑
i=1
Aijξi = Bjbj
xj = Qj if
N∑
i=1
Aijξi < Bjbj
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The market maker has two decision variables for his/her optimal clearing of the market: the
equilibrium state prices ξ and the order fill vector x.
Like other market makers in the financial markets, the market maker of the KPM also has an
inventory of contingent claims. If the ith state is realized in the future, the inventory subjects
the market maker to the monetary payoff of wi. Let α denote the market maker’s risk aversion
coefficient. Suppose that the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function u(x) = −e−αx
characterizes the market maker’s risk appetite.
The market maker has Knightian ambiguity toward the random future event on which the
claims are written. Let the set Ψ define the set of probability distributions that the market maker
considers. q ∈ RN×1 is the market maker’s pivot probability distribution. Assume that every
element in q is strictly positive. Any probability distribution for which the Kullback-Leibler from
q is no greater than Ω is acceptable for the market maker. Ω quantifies the market maker’s level
of ambiguity aversion. A large value of Ω implies that the market maker has strong ambiguity
aversion. The ith elements of p and q describe the market maker’s probabilistic belief about the
ith outcome.
Ψ =
{
p ∈ RN×1|p ≥ 0,
N∑
i=1
pi = 1,
N∑
i=1
pi ln
(
pi
qi
)
≤ Ω
}
(7)
4.2 The Market-Clearing Optimization Problem
We assume that the market maker adheres to the standard decision-making theory under Knightian
ambiguity aversion. The market maker’s optimization problem can be framed as (8). Unlike the
CPCAM, the KPM asks the market participants to pay the market-clearing prices of the claims
instead of the bid prices they submitted.
This optimization problem does not make any arbitrary assumptions. The problem is a corollary
of the standard theory of decision making under ambiguity aversion. However, the constraints (E1)
- (E3) and the objective function causes the problem to be non-convex. Finding a global optimal
solution to a non-convex optimization problem is extremely difficult.
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max
ξ,x
min
p∈Ψ
−
∑N
i=1 pi exp
[
−αwi − α
∑J
j=1 xj
((
AT ξ
)
j
−Aij
)]
such that
(A) Ψ =
{
p ∈ RN×1|p ≥ 0,
∑N
i=1 pi = 1,
∑N
i=1 pi ln
(
pi
qi
)
≤ Ω
}
(B) ξ ≥ 0
(C)
∑N
i=1 ξi = 1
(E1) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, .., J}, xj = 0 if
(
AT ξ
)
j
> Bjbj
(E2) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, .., J}, xj ∈ [0, Qj ] if
(
AT ξ
)
j
= Bjbj
(E3) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, .., J}, xj = Qj if
(
AT ξ
)
j
< Bjbj
(8)
Corollary 1 Suppose that the market maker holds zero inventory: wi = 0 for ∀i. As the value
of Ω increases to infinity, the KPM becomes completely pari-mutuel. The market maker incurs no
loss regardless of the outcome.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The KPMmay not be completely pari-mutuel in the sense that the market maker can lose money
with positive probability. However, Corollary 1 shows that the KPM subsumes a completely pari-
mutuel market. By adjusting the value of Ω, the market designer can fine-tune the extent to which
the market is close to being completely pari-mutuel. The larger the value of Ω, the more completely
pari-mutuel the market becomes.
For example, consider increasing the value of Ω. Problem (8) then models the auctioneer with
a large level of ambiguity aversion. The ambiguity-averse DM is very sensitive to the worst-case
scenario. Thus, the auctioneer clears the market such that he/she performs moderately even in the
worst-case scenario. In other words, the auctioneer does not want to lose too much money even
in the worst-case scenario.5 In the extreme case in which Ω diverges to infinity, the auctioneer
becomes so conservative that he/she does not want to lose any money under any circumstances.
The market should become completely pari-mutuel.
4.3 The Market-Clearing Algorithm
Before further discussion, we introduce new notations: zi = −e
−αwi and θi = qie
Ω for each i ∈
{1, 2, ..., N}. In addition, let F be the set of pairs (ξ,x) that satisfy the limit order logic constraints
(E1), (E2), and (E3).
5The cost of this strategy is that the market maker may not be able to make a great deal of money on the upside.
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Lemma 1 (ξ,x) = (ξ∗,x∗) is an optimal solution to (8) if and only if it is part of an optimal
solution to (9).
min
ξ,x,µ,d,ζ
µ ln
(∑N
i=1 θie
−
di
µ
)
such that
(A) −di = −zie
ζi for ∀i
(B) ζi ≥ α
∑J
j=1
[
xjAij −Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj (xj −Qj)
]
for ∀i
(C) ζi ≥ α
∑J
j=1 [xjAij −Bjbjxj ] for ∀i
(F) µ ≥ 0
(G) ξ ≥ 0
(H)
∑N
i=1 ξi = 1
(I) (x, ξ) ∈ F
(9)
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is difficult to directly apply well-known optimization algorithms (e.g., the interior-point
method) to solve (9) because the problem is non-convex. The problem is non-convex because
F is not a convex set.
Suppose C is a convex set of pairs (x, ξ). We define another optimization problem (10).
min
ξ,x,µ,d,ζ
µ ln
(∑N
i=1 θie
−
di
µ
)
such that
(A) −di = −zie
ζi for ∀i
(B) ζi ≥ α
∑J
j=1
[
xjAij −Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj (xj −Qj)
]
for ∀i
(C) ζi ≥ α
∑J
j=1 [xjAij −Bjbjxj] for ∀i
(F) µ ≥ 0
(G) (x, ξ) ∈ C
(10)
Lemma 2 The optimization problem (10) is a convex optimization problem.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Our general strategy is as follows. First, we express the set of pairs (x, ξ) that satisfies the
constraints (G), (H) and (I) in (9) as a union of multiple convex sets C1,C2,...,CM . Second, we
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solve a convex optimization problem (10) with C replaced with each Cm, m ∈ {1, ...,M}. Let Lm
denote the optimal value of the objective function from solving the convex optimization problem
(10) with C = Cm. Let (xm, ξm) denote the optimal solutions to those problems. Third, we
find m∗ = argmax
m
Lm. (xm∗ , ξm∗) becomes the global optimal solution to the main optimization
problem (9). By Lemma 1, (xm∗ , ξm∗) is the global optimal solution to (8).
4.3.1 Partitioning of the Feasible Set
Suppose that a total of K types of contingent claims are traded in the market. Let the vector
Pk ∈ R
N denote the payoff structure of the kth security (1 ≤ k ≤ K). For example, if the ith
outcome is realized, the person holding the claim receives Pk,i per share from the market maker.
Because there are J outstanding orders in the limit order book, there are J limit prices. Let
nk denote the number of distinct limit prices associated with the kth security. If there are multiple
orders with the same limit price and the same security, only one is counted toward nk. Sort those
bid prices in ascending order. Let Blk denote the lth smallest limit price associated with the kth
security.
Example 1 For the sake of simplicity, consider a market in which only Arrow-Debreu securities
are traded. Suppose that N = 5. Suppose that there are K = 5 different Arrow-Debreu securities,
one for each state of the world. The kth Arrow-Debreu security pays $1 per share to its holder if
and only if the kth state is realized.
Five row vectors in (11) show the payoff structures of Arrow-Debreu securities. For example, the
nonzero entry in the first element of P1 implies that the first security pays $1 per share if the first
outcome is realized.
P1 =
[
1 0 0 0 0
]
P2 =
[
0 1 0 0 0
]
P3 =
[
0 0 1 0 0
]
P4 =
[
0 0 0 1 0
]
P5 =
[
0 0 0 0 1
]
(11)
Table 1 illustrates seven orders (J = 7) outstanding in the limit order book. For example, the
person who submitted the first order wants to buy the first Arrow-Debreu security. The entry 0.18
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order limit security limit payoff matrix
quantity price outcome #
# Q # b 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.001 1 0.18 1 0 0 0 0
2 0.001 2 0.18 0 1 0 0 0
3 0.001 3 0.18 0 0 1 0 0
4 0.001 4 0.18 0 0 0 1 0
5 0.002 1 0.20 1 0 0 0 0
6 0.001 1 0.25 1 0 0 0 0
7 0.001 1 0.20 1 0 0 0 0
Table 1: An example of a limit order book
in the fourth column implies that he/she is willing to pay at most 0.18 dollars per share. The
payoff matrix in the last five columns shows how the person will be paid by the market maker. For
example, the market maker will pay $1 to the person who submitted the first order if and only if
the first outcome is realized. The person who submitted the fourth order will receive $1 if and only
if the fourth outcome is realized.
Based on this limit order book, we can determine the number of distinct limit prices associated
with each Arrow-Debreu security. For example, for the first Arrow-Debreu security, there are three
distinct limit prices: 0.18, 0.20 and 0.25. Thus, n1 should be 3. Likewise, n2 = 1, n3 = 1, n4 = 1,
and n5 = 0.
Next, we sort the limit prices in ascending order. For example, for the first Arrow-Debreu security,
we have B11 = 0.18, B
2
1 = 0.20, and B
3
1 = 0.25. In addition, B
1
2 = 0.18, B
1
3 = 0.18, and B
1
4 = 0.18.
Because there is no limit order associated with the fifth Arrow-Debreu security, B15 is undefined. 
Suppose that there are nk distinct limit prices. Let E denote the N -dimensional space defined
as (12). We define nk + 1 convex subsets of E such that if ξ is restricted to one of those subsets,
(8) becomes a convex optimization problem. The intuition is as follows. The limit order logic
constraints (E1) - (E3) are non-convex because we do not know which of the three conditions -(
AT ξ
)
j
> bj or
(
AT ξ
)
j
= bj or
(
AT ξ
)
j
< bj - hold at an optimal solution. We define subsets to
ensure that such ambiguitiy is resolved within each set. As a result, the limit order logic constraints
can be replaced by xj = 0 or xj ∈ [0, Qj ] or xj = Qj.
E =
{
ξ ∈ RN |
N∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0
}
(12)
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Let us illustrate how we obtain subsets of E. Note that the market-clearing price of each Arrow-
Debreu security is bounded below by 0 and above by 1. nk distinct bid prices associated with the
kth Arrow-Debreu security define 2nk+1 subsets of [0, 1]: [0, B
1
k ], B
1
k, [B
1
k, B
2
k ], B
2
k,...,B
nk
k ,[B
nk
k , 1].
6
These 2nk + 1 points or closed intervals can be used to define 2nk + 1 subsets of E: E
1
k, E
2
k ,...,
E2nk+1k , as shown in (14).
E1k =
{
ξ ∈ RN |
N∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,Pkξ ∈[0, B
1
k ]
}
E2k =
{
ξ ∈ RN |
N∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,Pkξ =B
1
k
}
...
E2nk+1k =
{
ξ ∈ RN |
N∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,Pkξ ∈[B
nk
k , 1]
}
(13)
Example 2 We continue with the earlier example. Let us begin with the first Arrow-Debreu
security. Using the three distinct limit prices, we can define 2 × 3 + 1 = 7 subsets of E ={
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0
}
: E11 , E
2
1 , ..., E
7
1 . Note that P1ξ =ξ1.
E11 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,0 ≤ ξ1 ≤ 0.18
}
E21 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,ξ1 = 0.18
}
E31 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,0.18 ≤ ξ1 ≤ 0.2
}
E41 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,ξ1 = 0.2
}
E51 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,0.2 ≤ ξ1 ≤ 0.25
}
E61 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,ξ1 = 0.25
}
E71 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,0.25 ≤ ξ1 ≤ 1
}
(14)
There is only one distinct limit price for the second Arrow-Debreu security. Therefore, we can
define three subsets of the set E as (15). The third and the fourth Arrow-Debreu securities also
6I assume that the bid prices are strictly larger than 0 and strictly smaller than 1.
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have only one limit price. Therefore, the partitioning of E should work in exactly the same way.
E12 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,0 ≤ ξ2 ≤ 0.18
}
E22 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,ξ2 = 0.18
}
E32 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,0.18 ≤ ξ2 ≤ 1
} (15)
There is no outstanding order or limit price associated with the fifth Arrow-Debreu security. Thus,
we can define only one subset of the set E: E15 .
E15 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0
}
(16)

We introduce new notation as (17). The idea is as follows. Having n1 distinct limit prices
associated with the first security yields 2n1 + 1 distinct subsets of E. Choose one subset out of
these 2n1+1 subsets. Similarly, choose one of 2n2+1 subsets of E that we generate from the limit
prices associated with the second security. Repeat this process for the remaining Arrow-Debreu
securities. Once we have one subset for each type of Arrow-Debreu security, we can obtain the
intersection of those K subsets, which is shown in (17). There are a total of ΠKk=1(2nk + 1) ways
to choose a combination of subsets.
E(ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓK) = E
ℓ1
1 ∩ E
ℓ2
2 ∩ ... ∩E
ℓK
K
where 1 ≤ ℓ1 ≤ 2n1 + 1, ..., 1 ≤ ℓK ≤ 2nK + 1
(17)
Now consider the optimization problem (9). Imagine replacing the constraint
N∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0
with a more restrictive one (17). The part that causes problem (9) to be non-convex is (18).
However, once the feasible set of the state price vector ξ is restricted to a smaller set E(ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓK),
(18) can be replaced with xj = 0 or xj ∈ [0, Qj ] or xj = Qj for ∀j.
xj = 0 if
(
AT ξ
)
j
> Bjbj
xj ∈ [0, Qj ] if
(
AT ξ
)
j
= Bjbj
xj = Qj if
(
AT ξ
)
j
< Bjbj
for ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J} (18)
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Example 3 Again, we continue with the previous example. Because n1 = 3, n2 = 1, n3 = 1,
n4 = 1, and n5 = 0 there are in total (3×2+1)×(1×2+1)×(1×2+1)×(1×2+1)×(0×2+1) = 189
different sets of the form E(ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3, ℓ4, ℓ5).
To illustrate, consider a particular case in which ℓ1 = 1, ℓ2 = 2, ℓ3 = 2, ℓ4 = 2, and ℓ5 = 1.
Eℓ11 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,0 ≤ ξ0 ≤ 0.18
}
Eℓ22 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,ξ1 = 0.18
}
Eℓ33 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,ξ2 = 0.18
}
Eℓ44 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,ξ3 = 0.18
}
Eℓ55 =
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0
}
(19)
E(ℓ1 = 1, ℓ2 = 2, ℓ3 = 2, ℓ4 = 2, ℓ5 = 1) (20)
=
{
ξ ∈ R5|
5∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0,0 ≤ ξ1 ≤ 0.18, ξ2 = ξ3 = ξ4 = 0.18
}
Suppose that we replace the usual constraint
N∑
i=1
ξi = 1, ξ ≥ 0 with a more restrictive one (20) in
the main optimization problem. Then, the optimization should take the form of (21).
min
ξ,x,µ,ζ,ω
µ ln
(∑5
i=1 θie
−
di
µ
)
such that
(A) ωi ≥ −zie
ζi for ∀i
(B) ζi ≥ α
∑7
j=1
[
xjAij −Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj (xj −Qj)
]
, ∀i
(C) ζi ≥ α
∑7
j=1 [xjAij −Bjbjxj], ∀i
(D) µ ≥ 0
(E) ξ ∈ E(1, 2, 2, 2, 1)
(F)
xj = 0 if
(
AT ξ
)
j
> Bjbj
xj ∈ [0, Qj ] if
(
AT ξ
)
j
= Bjbj
xj = Qj if
(
AT ξ
)
j
< Bjbj
for ∀j
(21)
As long as constraint (E) holds, constraint (F) can be replaced with those in the last column of
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Table 2.
order limit security bid market relevant restriction
# quantity # price clearing restriction on the
b price in E(1, 2, 2, 2, 1) order fill xj
1 0.001 1 0.18 ξ1 ξ1 ≤ 0.18 x1 = 0.001
2 0.001 2 0.18 ξ2 ξ2 = 0.18 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 0.001
3 0.001 3 0.18 ξ3 ξ3 = 0.18 0 ≤ x3 ≤ 0.001
4 0.001 4 0.18 ξ4 ξ4 = 0.18 0 ≤ x4 ≤ 0.001
5 0.002 1 0.20 ξ1 ξ1 ≤ 0.18 x5 = 0.001
6 0.001 1 0.25 ξ1 ξ1 ≤ 0.18 x6 = 0.001
7 0.001 1 0.20 ξ1 ξ1 ≤ 0.18 x7 = 0.001
Table 2 An Example of How the Limit Order Logic Constraint Can be Simplified
Solving (21) is equivalent to solving (22).
min
ξ,x,µ,ζ,ω
ℓ (µ) = µ ln
(∑5
i=1 θie
−
di
µ
)
such that
(A) −di ≥ −zie
ζi for ∀i
(B) ζi ≥ α
∑7
j=1
[
xjAij −Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj (xj −Qj)
]
, ∀i
(C) ζi ≥ α
∑7
j=1 [xjAij −Bjbjxj], ∀i
(D) µ ≥ 0
(E) ξ ∈ E(1, 2, 2, 2, 1)
(F) x1 = x5 = x6 = x7 = 0.001, 0 ≤ x2, x3, x4 ≤ 0.001
(22)

For notational simplicity, we define new sets:
X(ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓm) (23)
=


x ∈ RJ |
xj = 0 if max
ξ∈E(ℓ1,ℓ2,...,ℓK)
(
AT ξ
)
j
> Bjbj and
xj ∈ [0, Qj ] if min
ξ∈E(ℓ1,ℓ2,...,ℓK)
(
AT ξ
)
j
= max
ξ∈E(ℓ1,ℓ2,...,ℓK)
(
AT ξ
)
j
= Bjbj
xj = Qj if min
ξ∈E(ℓ1,ℓ2,...,ℓK)
(
AT ξ
)
j
< Bjbj
, ∀j


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Example 4 We continue with the previous example. X(1, 2, 2, 2, 1) is defined as (24).
X(1, 2, 2, 2, 1) =
{
x ∈ R7|x1 = x5 = x6 = x7 = 0.001, 0 ≤ x2, x3, x4 ≤ 0.001
}
(24)
4.3.2 The Pseudo-Code
If we apply an interative method (e.g., the interior point method) to solve (10), µ may converge
toward zero along the path. However, the objective function is ill-defined when µ is zero. Therefore,
we define a new objective function as (25).
L (µ,ω) =
µ ln
(∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
)
if µ > 0
max1≤i≤N ωi if µ = 0
(25)
Then, (9) can be reformulated as (26).
min
ξ,x,µ,ζ,ω
L (µ,ω)
such that
(A) ωi ≥ −zie
ζi for ∀i
(B) ζi ≥ α
∑J
j=1
[
xjAij −Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj (xj −Qj)
]
, ∀i
(C) ζi ≥ α
∑J
j=1 [xjAij −Bjbjxj], ∀i
(D) µ ≥ 0
(E) ξ ≥ 0
(F)
N∑
i=1
ξi = 1
(G) (x, ξ) ∈ F
(26)
21
A global optimal solution to (26) can be obtained by executing the following pseudo-code.
min
ξ,x,µ,ζ,ω
L (µ,ω)
such that
(A) ωi ≥ −zie
ζi for ∀i
(B) ζi ≥ α
∑J
j=1
[
xjAij −Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj (xj −Qj)
]
, ∀i
(C) ζi ≥ α
∑J
j=1 [xjAij −Bjbjxj], ∀i
(D) µ ≥ 0
(E) x ∈ E(ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓK)
(F) ξ ∈ X(ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓK)
(27)
for ℓ1 = 1 : 1 : n1
for ℓ2 = 1 : 1 : n2
...
for ℓK = 1 : 1 : nK
if E(ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓK) 6= ∅
Solve (27) using the interior point method.
The optimal value of the objective function → L∗(ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓK)
The optimizing value of x → x∗(ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓK)
The optimizing value of ξ → ξ∗(ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓK)
end
end
...
for
end
argmaxℓ1,ℓ2,...,ℓK ,E(ℓ1,ℓ2,...,ℓK)6=∅ L
∗(ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓK) → ℓ
∗
1, ℓ
∗
2, ..., ℓ
∗
K
x∗(ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓK), ξ
∗(ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓK) → global optimal solution
(28)
4.3.3 The Computational Efficiency
In modern complexity analysis, the efficiency of an algorithm is assessed based on whether the
number of iterations required is bounded above by a polynomial of the problem dimension (Luen-
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berger and Ye, 2008). In our setting, the number of securities traded in the market typically does
not grow in the order of thousands. Frequently, a growing number of outstanding orders in the
limit order book demands significant computing power. Therefore, to prove that our algorithm is
of practical value, we need to show that the algorithm is polynomial in the number of outstanding
orders J . Theorem 3 does precisely this.
Theorem 3 The number of iterations required to execute the pseudo-code (28) is bounded above
by a polynomial function of the number of outstanding orders J .
Proof. See the Appendix.
5 Simulation
For simplicity, we simulate the market when only Arrow-Debreu securities are traded. The ith
security pays $1 per share to the holder if and only if state i is realized at maturity, where i ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Through this simulation exercise, we verify that our market-clearing algorithm gives the result
that is consistent with economic intuition.
5.1 Simulation A: Market Maker’s Ambiguity Aversion
In this subsection, we present simulation results that show how the market maker’s level of ambi-
guity aversion affects how the market is cleared. We run simulations for five different parameters
of ambiguity aversion: Ω = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 1, 2. Table 3 shows the sample limit order book used for
Simulation A. Table 4 summarizes the parameters used for each of the five iterations. The table
reports the number of shares that traders as a whole hold. Thus, any positive number in the top-left
part of the table implies that the market maker may have to incur additional loss at the time the
securities mature.
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order limit security bid price payoff matrix buy
# quantity # per state state state state state or
b share 1 2 3 4 5 sell
1 0.002 1 0.18 1 0 0 0 0 buy
2 0.001 2 0.18 0 1 0 0 0 buy
3 0.001 3 0.18 0 0 1 0 0 buy
4 0.001 4 0.18 0 0 0 1 0 buy
5 0.001 5 0.18 0 0 0 0 1 buy
Table 3 Sample Limit Order Book Used for Simulation A
Table 4: The Set of Parameters Used for Each Iteration
In Table 3, we purposefully make the bid prices slightly lower than 0.2. For example, because of
the limit order logic, the market-clearing price of the first state has to be equal to or smaller than
0.18 for the market maker to accept the first order. If he/she wants to accept all five outstanding
orders, he/she has to make every state price lower than or equal to 0.18. However, because the state
prices must sum to 1, it is impossible to do so. Therefore, the market maker has to strategically
accept some orders while declining others. We investigate how the market maker’s ambiguity
aversion affects this strategic decision making through this simulation.
When making a strategic choice over the five outstanding orders, there are two counteracting
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forces. The first factor derives from the skewness in the pivot prior probability distribution. This
factor causes the market maker to want to accept orders #1, #2, or #3. According to the market
maker’s subjective probabilistic belief, he/she is very unlikely to be forced to pay money at the
time the securities mature. However, the factor causes the market maker to not want to accept
order #4 or #5.
This factor becomes weaker with an increasingly large value of Ω. Suppose that the value
of Ω becomes increasingly large. The set Ψ of probability distributions that the market maker
considers in his/her decision making becomes larger. As a result, the upper bound and the lower
bound on the probability of a particular outcome becomes higher and lower, respectively. The
widening gap between the upper and lower bounds causes the market maker’s probabilistic belief
to be increasingly uninformative. For example, suppose that the value of Ω is extremely large. The
probability of a particular outcome can be as high as 1 and as low as 0. In such a case, it is as if
the market maker had no information about the event. In conclusion, a larger value of Ω causes
the market maker to further disregard the pivot prior distribution in making the decision, thereby
weakening the first factor.
The second factor derives from the market maker’s aversion to extreme downside risk. The
price of any Arrow-Debreu security is between 0 and 1. Thus, the worst-case payoff of any Arrow-
Debreu security is typically negative for the market maker.7 Fearing this worst-case scenario, the
ambiguity-averse market maker will not want to purchase the security. This factor causes the
market maker to not want to fill any outstanding order.
The second factor becomes stronger with an increasing value of Ω. Ω is a parameter that
captures the extent to which the market maker is ambiguity averse. The larger the value of Ω, the
more ambiguity averse the market maker. Ambiguity aversion causes the DM to become obsessed
with the worst-case scenario. Therefore, a large value of Ω causes the second factor to become
stronger.
Figure 1 shows the simulation result. The result can be easily interpreted using the two coun-
teracting forces we just explained. First, consider the situation in which Ω is small. The first factor
dominates the second factor. As a result, the market maker accepts orders #1, #2 and #3 while
declining orders #4 and #5. Second, consider the case in which Ω is large. Here, the second factor
dominates the first factor. The market maker does not accept any order when Ω is larger than 0.4.
7It is zero if and only if the price is 1.
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Figure 1: The graph shows the order fills for different values of Ω, which parametrizes the market
maker’s level of ambiguity aversion. For example, when Ω is 0.4, a 0.001 share of the second Arrow-
Debreu security is filled. The second Arrow-Debreu security pays $1 to its holder if and only if the
second state is realized at maturity.
5.2 Simulation B: Market Maker’s Pivot Probability Distribution
In this subsection, we show how the market maker’s pivot prior probabilistic belief affects the way
our algorithm clears the market. Table 5 below shows the limit order book used for this subsection.
Table 6 below shows the set of simulation parameters for both iterations.
order limit security bid price payoff matrix buy
# quantity # per state state state state state or
b share 1 2 3 4 5 sell
1 0.001 1 0.18 1 0 0 0 0 buy
2 0.001 2 0.18 0 1 0 0 0 buy
3 0.001 3 0.18 0 0 1 0 0 buy
4 0.001 4 0.18 0 0 0 1 0 buy
5 0.001 5 0.18 0 0 0 0 1 buy
Table 5 Sample Limit Order Book Used for Simulation B
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Figure 2: The two prior distributions used for the simulation. For example, the market maker with
the exponential prior believes that state 5 will be realized with 63.6% probability.
Table 6: The Set of Parameters Used for Simulation B
Figure 2 shows the two prior distributions used in this simulation exercise. The market maker
with the uniform prior has no information on what will happen in the future. With no valuable
piece of evidence available to make an inference, the market maker simply assumes that each state
is equally probable. In contrast, the market maker with the exponential prior is more assertive in
deciding which state is more probable than the others. For example, he/she thinks that state 5 is
at least sixty times more probable than state 1.
Figure 3 shows the outcome of the market-clearing algorithm for two prior distributions. We
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Figure 3: The graph shows the market clearance result for different prior beliefs held by the market
maker. The vertical axis shows the number of shares of each Arrow-Debreu security filled. For
example, in the case of the exponential prior, 0.001 shares of the first Arrow-Debreu security are
filled (the first Arrow-Debreu security pays $1 to its holder if and only if state 1 is realized at
maturity).
interpret the result with the countervailing forces introduced in the previous section.
For the market maker with the completely uninformative prior, the second factor strongly
dominates the first factor. The first factor is powerless because, with the uniform prior, the market
maker does not face a larger risk of incurring a loss in one state than in the other states. Dominated
by the second force, the market maker does not accept any order.
On the contrary, the first factor is much stronger for the market maker with the exponential
prior. The first, the second, and the third states receive very small probability weights. Therefore,
the market maker views selling the first security as an opportunity to make a riskless profit of 0.18
dollars per share. By a similar line of reasoning, the market maker has a strong disincentive against
accepting the fifth order. The result is in accordance with this intuition. Figure 3 shows that the
market maker with the exponential prior accepts only the first, second, and third orders.
6 The Strength of the KPM: Empirical Discussion
Based on a solid understanding of a pari-mutuel auctioneer from the perspective of market mi-
crostructure theory, we discuss why a market making firm may want to organize a derivative
market based on the KPM.
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6.1 Why Automate?
The KPM is an automated market maker. The main strength of an automated market maker
relative to its human counterpart derives from its ability to update quotes for dozens of related
securities almost instantaneously. This ability reduces adverse selection cost, thereby allowing
market makers to provide more competitive quotes to customers.
In today’s increasingly electronic and automated trading environment, the market maker’s
ability to quickly update his/her quotes is increasingly important. The various speeds with which
market participants react to the arrival of new information represent a source of informational
asymmetry (Foucault et al., 2003; Litzenberger, 2012). In particular, liquidity suppliers who are
slow to react to new information can leave their stale quotes vulnerable to being adversely picked
off by high-frequency traders (Hendershott and Riordan, 2013). The competition to respond to new
information faster than anyone else has become so intense that trading firms want to place their
computers the building where the exchange’s matching machine is: The time it takes for the light
to travel from their computers to the matching machine matters (Litzenberger, 2012). Given this
extraordinarily high-frequency trading environment, the automation of the quote-updating process
is important for the liquidity supplier to survive.
This adverse selection cost becomes particularly important for a market maker involved in
multiple related markets: Quotes need to be consistent with one another to ensure that there is
no arbitrage opportunity. With more information to process, the comparative advantage of the
automated market maker over the human counterpart can only become more significant (Gerig and
Michayluk, 2013).
The KPM is an automated algorithm through which the liquidity supplier can quickly price
multiple contingent claims while taking into account a variety of factors. The resulting prices
reflect the market maker’s risk aversion and ambiguity aversion while ensuring that there is no
arbitrage opportunity.
6.2 Other Well-Known Strengths of a Pari-mutuel Auction
First, the ISE is interested in the PDCA mainly because pari-mutuel markets can effectively miti-
gate counterparty risk (Burne, 2013). The pari-mutuel auctioneer can be thought of as the central
clearing counterparty (CCP). In particular, the pari-mutuel auctioneer is the common CCP oper-
ating in multiple contingent claims markets. The fact that one auctioneer handles multiple markets
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allows the pari-mutuel market to better mitigate counterparty risk.8
Second, the auction performs better than other trading platforms, particularly in a low-liquidity
environment. The auction aggregates liquidity dispersed in multiple individual markets into the
common pool. Lastly, having the common market maker in multiple markets improves price effi-
ciency (Lange and Economide, 2005). Please see the Appendix for further details.
6.3 Potential Areas of Application
The KPM is expected to be useful for options markets in which delta hedging the market maker’s
inventory is not feasible.9 The KPM solves an optimization that is robust to worst-case scenarios.
In particular, Corollary 1 shows that the KPM can become almost completely pari-mutuel when
the value of Ω is very large. If the market is completely pari-mutuel, the market maker does not
lose any money regardless of what happens at maturity. Therefore, the inability to delta hedge the
inventory becomes less critical.
There are two specific options markets for which delta hedging may be particularly infeasible.
The first example is options for which the underlying asset is not tradable (e.g., the market for
economic derivatives written on U.S. non-farm payrolls) (Baron and Lange, 2007). The second
example is options with extremely short time to maturity because the delta fluctuates too much
(Baron and Lange, 2007).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we first show that the market-clearing strategy of the Convex Pari-mutuel Call
Auction Mechanism (CCPAM) is asymptotically equivalent to that of the market maker with
extreme ambiguity aversion for the future contingent event. Because the CPCAM is closely related
to other notable pari-mutuel auctions in the literature, we regard this conclusion as a basis for
arguing that pari-mutuel auctions are closely related to ambiguity aversion.
With this understanding, we design a new market for trading contingent claims, the Knightian
Pari-mutuel Mechanism (KPM). The main optimization problem of the KPM is what the market
maker should solve if he/she adheres to the theory of decision making under ambiguity aversion.
The algorithm clears the market while controlling for the market maker’s level of risk and ambiguity
8Duffie and Zhu (2011) show that counterparty risk can be better managed if the same CCP is involved in more
than one market.
9Baron and Lange (2007) also argue that the PDCA is suitable for markets where delta hedging is difficult.
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aversion. We present a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the optimization problem.
Our paper may contribute to facilitating the adoption of a pari-mutuel mechanism in the trading
community. As Robert Shiller once noted, a pari-mutuel mechanism can be particularly useful in
launching a wide variety of innovative derivatives markets, thereby enabling investors to hedge a
new class of fundamental risks (Baron and Lange, 2007).
8 Appendix
8.1 Illustration of the Theory of Decision Making Under Uncertainty
Suppose that there is an urn that contains red, blue and green balls, of which there are 90 in total.
While there are 30 red balls in the urn, the exact number of either blue balls or green balls is
unknown to the DM. Suppose that five lotteries are available. Lottery R pays $1 if and only if the
DM draws a red ball from the urn. Lotteries B and G pay $1 if and only if he/she draws a blue
ball and a green ball, respectively. Similarly, lottery RB pays $1 if and only if either a red ball or
a blue ball is drawn. Lottery BG pays $1 if and only if either a blue ball or a green ball is drawn.
Empirical studies show that most people prefer lottery R to either lottery B or G. Moreover, most
people prefer lottery BG to RB. It is well known that this empirical result contradicts Savage’s
theory of utility maximization with subjective probability (Savage, 1954).
Let us reformulate the DM’s problem in the language of Theorem 1. The set of all possible
states S is {red, blue, green}. The set of consequences X is {0, 1}, expressed in dollars. The DM
is interested in five different acts: fR, fB, fG, fRB, and fBG. The act fR : S −→ X is a mapping
such that fR(red) = 1, fR(blue) = 0 and fR(green) = 0. We define the other four acts similarly.
Without knowing the exact number of either blue or green balls, the DM cannot attach a single
probability distribution to S. Suppose that the DM’s set of candidates is Ψ = {(1/3, x, 2/3 − x) ∈
R
3|0.1 ≤ x ≤ 0.4}, where 1/3, x,and 2/3 − x are the chances of drawing red, blue and green balls,
respectively.
Let u : X −→ R denote the DM’s utility function. Equations (29a) and (29b) should hold for
the DM to prefer lottery R to the other two lotteries.
min
0.1≤x≤0.4
[
1
3
u(1) +
2
3
u(0)
]
≥ min
0.1≤x≤0.4
[x · u(1) + (1− x) · u(0)] (29a)
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min
0.1≤x≤0.4
[
1
3
u(1) +
2
3
u(0)
]
≥ min
0.1≤x≤0.4
[(
2
3
− x
)
· u(1) + (
1
3
+ x) · u(0)
]
(29b)
In addition, equation (30) must hold for the DM to prefer lottery BG to RB.
min
0.1≤x≤0.4
[
2
3
u(1) +
1
3
u(0)
]
≥ min
0.1≤x≤0.4
[(
1
3
+ x
)
· u(1) + (
2
3
− x) · u(0)
]
(30)
Equations (29a), (29b) and (30) hold as long as the utility function is non-decreasing. Theorem 1
successfully reconciles the theory with empirical observations. 
8.2 The Proof of Theorem 2
If we assume that δi = δ for ∀i, (3) is a barrier problem to (31).
max
x,M
bTx−M
such that
(A)
∑J
j=1Ai,jxj ≤M for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}
(B) 0 ≤ x ≤ Q
(31)
Assume that the feasible set for (31) is not empty. Sending the value of the parameter δ to
zero is equivalent to reducing the duality gap along the primal-dual central path in the interior
point method. Thus, as δ approaches zero, x(δ) should converge to an optimal solution to (31)
(Luenberger and Ye, 2008), which we denote x∗.
(31) is equivalent to (32).
max
x
[
bTx−max
i
∑J
j=1Ai,jxj
]
such that
(A’) 0 ≤ x ≤ Q
(32)
(32) is equivalent to (33).
max
x
min
i
u
[
bTx−
∑J
j=1Ai,jxj
]
such that
(A’) 0 ≤ x ≤ Q
(33)
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(33) is equivalent to (34).
max
x
min
p
N∑
i=1
piu
[
bTx−
∑J
j=1Ai,jxj
]
such that
(A’) 0 ≤ x ≤ Q
(B’) p ≥ 0,
∑N
i=1 pi = 1
(34)
8.3 The Proof of Corollary 1
With the assumption that wi = 0 for ∀i, (8) converges to (35) as the value of Ω increases to infinity.
max
ξ,x
min
p
−
∑N
i=1 pi exp
[
−α
∑J
j=1 xj
((
AT ξ
)
j
−Aij
)]
such that
(A) p ≥ 0,
∑N
i=1 pi = 1
(B) ξ ≥ 0
(C)
∑N
i=1 ξi = 1
(E1) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, .., J}, xj = 0 if
(
AT ξ
)
j
> Bjbj
(E2) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, .., J}, xj ∈ [0, Qj ] if
(
AT ξ
)
j
= Bjbj
(E3) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, .., J}, xj = Qj if
(
AT ξ
)
j
< Bjbj
(35)
Let ξ∗ and x∗ denote the values of ξ and x that optimize (35), respectively. Define i∗ as (36).
i∗ may not be uniquely defined. In that case, we simply choose any of multiple is that minimize
− exp
[
−α
∑J
j=1 xj
((
AT ξ
)
j
−Aij
)]
.
i∗ = argmin
i
− exp
[
−α
∑J
j=1
x∗j
((
AT ξ∗
)
j
−Aij
)]
(36)
Consider the inner minimization problem. To minimize the objective function, we need pi∗ = 1
and pi = 0 for ∀i 6= i
∗. If we substitute pi∗ = 1 and pi = 0 for ∀i 6= i
∗ into the objective function
of (35), we obtain (37).
− exp
[
−α
∑J
j=1
x∗j
((
AT ξ∗
)
j
−Ai∗j
)]
= min
i
− exp
[
−α
∑J
j=1
x∗j
((
AT ξ∗
)
j
−Aij
)]
(37)
If we substitute x = 0 into the objective function of (35), we obtain 1. Therefore, the optimal
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value of the objective function of (35), which is (37), should be at least as large as 1.
min
i
− exp
[
−α
∑J
j=1
x∗j
((
AT ξ∗
)
j
−Aij
)]
≥ 1 (38)
(38) is equivalent to (39).
min
i
∑J
j=1
x∗j
((
AT ξ∗
)
j
−Aij
)
≥ 0 (39)
∑J
j=1 x
∗
j
((
AT ξ∗
)
j
−Aij
)
is the monetary payoff for the market maker if the ith outcome is
realized. Therefore, min
i
∑J
j=1 x
∗
j
((
AT ξ∗
)
j
−Aij
)
is the worst possible monetary payoff that the
market maker can ever receive. Inequality (39) shows that the market maker never loses money
even in that worst-case scenario. The market is completely pari-mutuel.
8.4 The Proof of Lemma 1
8.4.1 The Dual Problem of the Inner Minimization Problem
(40) is the inner minimization problem isolated from (8). The optimal value of this inner optimiza-
tion problem is an implicit function of ξ and x. Because the objective function is linear in p and
Ψ is a convex set, this problem is a convex optimization problem.
min
p∈Ψ
∑N
i=1 pizi exp
[
−α
∑J
j=1 xj
((
AT ξ
)
j
−Aij
)]
such that
(A) Ψ =
{
p ∈ RN×1|p ≥ 0,
∑N
i=1 pi = 1,
∑N
i=1 pi ln
(
pi
qi
)
≤ Ω
} (40)
x and ξ should be treated like constants when solving (40). To make notations simpler, we
introduce new constants.
di = zi exp
[
−α
∑J
j=1
xj
((
AT ξ
)
j
−Aij
)]
for ∀i ∈ {1, .., N} (41)
d =
(
d1 d2 ... dN
)T
(42)
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Then, minimization problem (40) reduces to (43).
min
p
dTp
such that
(A) p ≥ 0
(B)
∑N
i=1 pi = 1
(C)
∑N
i=1 pi ln
(
pi
qi
)
≤ Ω
(43)
The domain of the minimization problem is D as defined in (44).
D =
{
p ∈ RN |p > 0
}
(44)
The Lagrangian associated with problem (43) is (45). λ1, λ2,..., λN , µ, ν are Lagrange multi-
pliers.
L(p,λ,µ, ν) = dTp+
N∑
i=1
λi (−pi) + µ
{
N∑
i=1
pi ln
(
pi
qi
)
− Ω¯
}
+ ν
(
N∑
i=1
pi − 1
)
(45)
The Lagrange dual function associated with problem (43) is (46).
g(λ,µ, ν) = inf
p>0
L(p,λ,µ, ν) (46)
L(p,λ,µ, ν) is a convex function of each pi. The first order condition is
∂L(p,λ,µ, ν)
∂pi
= (di − λi + ν) + µ
{
1 + ln
(
pi
qi
)}
= 0 (47)
1 + ln
(
pi
qi
)
= −
di − λi + ν
µ
(48)
pi = qi exp
(
−1 +
λi − di − ν
µ
)
> 0 (49)
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Because the function is convex, (49) is the global minimizer. We substitute (49) into (46).
g(λ,µ, ν)
=
N∑
i=1
(di − λi) qie
−1+
λi−di−ν
µ +
N∑
i=1
(−µ+ λi − di − ν) qie
−1+
λi−di−ν
µ − µΩ+ v
N∑
i=1
qie
−1+
λi−di−ν
µ − v
=
N∑
i=1
(−µ) qie
−1+
λi−di−ν
µ − µΩ− ν
= −µ
N∑
i=1
qie
−1+
λi−di−ν
µ − µΩ− ν (50)
The Lagrange dual problem associated with the inner minimization problem is (51).
max
λ,µ,ν
−µ
∑N
i=1 qie
−1+
λi−di−ν
µ − µΩ− ν
s.t.
λ1, ..., λN ≥ 0
µ ≥ 0
(51)
Each qi is assumed to be positive. µ is implicity assumed to be nonzero because it appears as
a denominator in (51). Therefore, the objective function of (51) decreases with increasing λi. The
optimal value of each λi should thus be zero. (51) reduces to (52).
max
µ,ν
−µ
∑N
i=1 qie
−1−
di+ν
µ − µΩ− ν
s.t.
µ ≥ 0
(52)
8.4.2 Applying Strong Duality to the Inner Minimization Problem
We use the trick presented in Palomar (2009) to address the max-min problem. We replace the
inner minimization problem with the dual maximization problem. This substitution is valid if and
only if strong duality holds. Then, the overall structure of the problem is max-max instead of
max-min. The double max structure can collapse to a more conventional problem with only one
maximization operator.
We use the criteria in Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004) to determine whether strong duality
holds. If the primal problem is convex and Slater’s condition holds, strong duality holds. Slater’s
condition holds if there exists a strictly feasible p ∈ relintD.
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Slater’s condition holds in the context of our problem as long as Ω is a strictly positive number
(i.e., p such that pi = qi for ∀i is a strictly feasible solution). Therefore, strong duality holds for
our inner minimization problem as long as Ω is strictly positive.
Using strong duality, our max-min problem can be transformed into (53).
max
ξ,x,d
max
µ,ν
−µ
∑N
i=1 qie
−1−
di+ν
µ − µΩ− ν
such that
(A) di = zi exp
[
−α
∑J
j=1 xj
((
AT ξ
)
j
−Aij
)]
for ∀i ∈ {1, .., N}
(B) µ ≥ 0
(C) ξ ≥ 0
(D)
∑N
i=1 ξi = 1
(E) (x, ξ) ∈ F
(53)
Two maximization operators can be collapsed into a single operator.
max
ξ,x,µ,ν,d
−µ
∑N
i=1 qie
−1−
di+ν
µ − µΩ− ν
such that
(A) di = zi exp
[
−α
∑J
j=1 xj
((
AT ξ
)
j
−Aij
)]
for ∀i ∈ {1, .., N}
(B) µ ≥ 0
(C) ξ ≥ 0
(D)
∑N
i=1 ξi = 1
(E) (x, ξ) ∈ F
(54)
8.4.3 Further Simplification through Algebraic Manipulation
Because the objective function of (54) is a strictly concave function of ν, we can find the global
optimizing value of ν from the first-order condition.
−µ
N∑
i=1
qi
(
−
1
µ
)
e
−1−
di+ν
µ − 1 = 0
N∑
i=1
qie
−1−
di+ν
µ = 1
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e−
ν
µ e−1
N∑
i=1
qie
−
di
µ = 1
−
ν
µ
− 1 + ln
(
N∑
i=1
qie
−
di
µ
)
= 0
ν∗ = −µ+ µ ln
(
N∑
i=1
qie
−
di
µ
)
(55)
We substitute (55) into the objective function of (54).
−µ
N∑
i=1
qie
−1−
di+ν
∗
µ − µΩ− ν∗
= −µ
e∑N
i=1 qie
−
di
µ
N∑
i=1
qie
−1−
di
µ − µΩ+ µ− µ ln
(
N∑
i=1
qie
−
di
µ
)
= −µ− µΩ+ µ− µ ln
(
N∑
i=1
qie
−
di
µ
)
= −µΩ− µ ln
(
N∑
i=1
qie
−
di
µ
)
(56)
Substituting (56) into (54) further simplifies the problem.
min
ξ,x,µ,d
µΩ+ µ ln
(∑N
i=1 qie
−
di
µ
)
such that
(A) di = zi exp
[
−α
∑J
j=1 xj
((
AT ξ
)
j
−Aij
)]
for ∀i ∈ {1, .., N}
(B) µ ≥ 0
(C) ξ ≥ 0
(D)
∑N
i=1 ξi = 1
(E) (x, ξ) ∈ F
(57)
We define new constants.
θi = e
Ωqi > 0 for ∀i (58)
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Then, the objective function of (57) can be more succinctly represented as a function of µ
ℓ (µ) = µΩ+ µ ln
(
N∑
i=1
qie
−
di
µ
)
= µ ln
(
N∑
i=1
qie
Ωe−
di
µ
)
= µ ln
(
N∑
i=1
θie
−
di
µ
)
(59)
The optimization problem then becomes:
min
ξ,x,µ,d
µ ln
(∑N
i=1 θie
−
di
µ
)
such that
(A) di = zi exp
[
−α
∑J
j=1 xj
((
AT ξ
)
j
−Aij
)]
for ∀i ∈ {1, .., N}
(B) µ ≥ 0
(C) ξ ≥ 0
(D)
∑N
i=1 ξi = 1
(E) (x, ξ) ∈ F
(60)
8.4.4 Linearization of Constraint (A)
Note that constraint (A) in (60) involves the quadratic terms
∑J
j=1 xj
(
AT ξ
)
j
. Therefore, in this
section, we suggest a way to linearize this constraint.
Intuitively, xj
(
AT ξ
)
j
is simply the market maker’s revenue from the jth order. Let Rj denote
the market maker’s revenue from the jth order. xj is the number of shares of the option traded.(
AT ξ
)
j
is the market-clearing price of the jth order.
To begin the transformation, we first consider the feasible set of x and ξ. We say that the pair
x and ξ are feasible if and only if the pair satisfies (61).
(E1) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, .., J}, xj = 0 if
(
AT ξ
)
j
> Bjbj
(E2) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, .., J}, xj ∈ [0, Qj ] if
(
AT ξ
)
j
= Bjbj
(E3) ∀j ∈ {1, 2, .., J}, xj = Qj if
(
AT ξ
)
j
< Bjbj
(61)
We restrict attention to the jth order. Figure 4 shows the feasible set of pairs xj and
(
AT ξ
)
j
.
The figure is just a graphic illustration of (61).10
Figure 5 is a three-dimensional graph. The graph shows the market maker’s revenue as a
10I can simply ignore cases for which Qj = 0. I can also simply remove the jth order from my optimization problem.
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Figure 4: The feasible set of xj and (A
T ξ)j
function of the quantity filled (xj) and the market-clearing price
(
AT ξ
)
j
.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 6 dissects Figure 5 into three distinct regions. Region (1)
corresponds to constraint (E1) in (61). Region (2) and (3) correspond to constraints (E2) and
(E3), respectively.
If we assume that the market-clearing price
(
AT ξ
)
j
and the quantity traded xj can take any
real values, the market maker’s revenue Rj becomes a nonlinear term
(
AT ξ
)
j
xj . However, if we
restrict attention to the feasible set in Figure 4, either the market-clearing price or the quantity
filled is held constant in each of the three regions. The market maker’s revenue Rj is a piece-wise
linear function.
Rj =


0 if
(
AT ξ
)
j
> Bjbj
Bjbjxj if
(
AT ξ
)
j
= Bjbj
Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
if
(
AT ξ
)
j
< Bjbj


(62)
(62) is equivalent to (63) as long as xj and
(
AT ξ
)
j
belong to the feasible set that Figure 4
represents.
[(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj
]+
is a short-hand notation for max
{
0,
(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj
}
.
Rj = Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
+Bjbj (xj −Qj)−Qj
[(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj
]+
(63)
For example, consider region (1) where
(
AT ξ
)
j
> Bjbj and xj = 0. Then, (63) reduces to (64).
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Figure 5: The market maker’s revenue from the jth order as a function of the quantity filled xj
and the market-clearing price of the jth order
(
A¯T ξ
)
j
Figure 6: The market maker’s revenue from the jth order as a function of the quantity filled xj
and the market-clearing price of the jth order
(
AT ξ
)
j
41
Note that (64) agrees with (62).
Rj = Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
+Bjbj (xj −Qj)−Qj
[(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj
]+
= Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
+Bjbj (xj −Qj)−Qj
[(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj
]
= Bjbjxj = Bjbj · 0 = 0 (64)
We can simplify (63):
Rj = Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
+Bjbj (xj −Qj)−Qj
[(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj
]+
= min
[
Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
+Bjbj (xj −Qj) , Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
+Bjbj (xj −Qj)−Qj
{(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj
}]
= min
[
Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
+Bjbj (xj −Qj) , Bjbjxj
]
(65)
Substitution of (65) into (60) yields (66). Constraint (E) in (66) ensures that the pair (x, ξ) is
within the feasible set shown in Figure 1. Replacement of the quadratic term with the piece-wise
linear term is valid due to this restriction.
min
ξ,x,µ,d
µ ln
(∑N
i=1 θie
−
di
µ
)
such that
(A) −di = −zie
α
∑J
j=1
[
xjAij−min
{
Qj(AT ξ)
j
+Bjbj(xj−Qj),Bjbjxj
}]
for ∀i
(B) µ ≥ 0
(C) ξ ≥ 0
(D)
∑N
i=1 ξi = 1
(E) (x, ξ) ∈ F
(66)
Because zi is negative and α is positive, constraint (A) of (66) is equivalent to (67).
− di = max
[
−zie
α
∑J
j=1
[
xjAij−Qj(AT ξ)
j
−Bjbj(xj−Qj)
]
,−zie
α
∑J
j=1[xjAij−Bjbjxj ]
]
(67)
To minimize the objective function of (66), −di must be minimized. Hence, the optimization
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problem can be further reduced to (68). Note that constraints (B) to (F) are all linear.
min
ξ,x,µ,d,ζ
µ ln
(∑N
i=1 θie
−
di
µ
)
such that
(A) −di = −zie
ζi for ∀i
(B) ζi ≥ α
∑J
j=1
[
xjAij −Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj (xj −Qj)
]
for ∀i
(C) ζi ≥ α
∑J
j=1 [xjAij −Bjbjxj] for ∀i
(F) µ ≥ 0
(G) ξ ≥ 0
(H)
∑N
i=1 ξi = 1
(I) (x, ξ) ∈ F
(68)
ζ ∈ RN×1 is a dummy varible.
ζ =
[
ζ1 ... ζN
]
8.5 The Proof of Lemma 2
In optimization problem (9), to minimize the objective, (−di) needs to be mininized. Define a new
vector ω ∈ RN×1 such that ω = [ω1, ..., ωN ] Hence, (9) is equivalent to (69).
min
ξ,x,µ,ζ,ω
µ ln
(∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
)
such that
(A) ωi ≥ −zie
ζi for ∀i
(B) ζi ≥ α
∑J
j=1
[
xjAij −Qj
(
AT ξ
)
j
−Bjbj (xj −Qj)
]
, ∀i
(C) ζi ≥ α
∑J
j=1 [xjAij −Bjbjxj], ∀i
(D) µ ≥ 0
(E) (x, ξ) ∈ C
(69)
My goal is to show that (69) is a convex optimization problem. A necessary preliminary step is to
show that the set of pairs of ωi and ζi that satisfy constraint (A) in (69) constitute a convex set.
Lemma 3 The set of pairs of ωi and ζ i that satisfy constraint (A) in (69) form a convex set.
Proof. Define a new function.
F (ωi, ζ i) = −ωi − zie
ζi (70)
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To prove the lemma, it suffices to show that function F is convex. The Hessian is:
∇2F =

 ∂2F∂ω2i ∂2F∂ωi∂ζi
∂2F
∂ωi∂ζi
∂2F
∂ζ2i

 =

 0 0
0 −zie
ζi

 (71)
Because zi is negative, ∇
2F is positive semidefinite. Therefore, F is convex.
The next step is to show that the objective function µ ln
(∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
)
is convex. Define a new
function.
G (ω1, ω2, ..., ωN , µ) = µ ln
(
N∑
i=1
θie
ωi
µ
)
(72)
Before proceeding with the proof, we present a very useful result from Boyd and Vandenberghe
(2004).11.
Lemma 4 Let the function f(y) be defined as (73) where ak,y ∈ R
n,bk ∈ R.
f(y) = ln
(
K∑
k=1
ea
T
k
y+bk
)
(73)
f(y) is a convex function.
Therefore, the Hessian of f(y) must be positive semidefinite.
Lemma 5 Function G, which is defined as (72), is convex.
Proof. Note that function G can be expressed as (74). With µ fixed, the structure of G as a
function of ω1, ω2, ..., ωN is exactly analogous to (73).
G (ω1, ω2, ..., ωN , µ) = µ ln
(
N∑
i=1
e
1
µ
ωi+ln θi
)
(74)
With µ fixed, G is a convex function of ω1, ω2, ..., ωN . Hence all the principal minors of the matrix
in (75) are nonnegative. 

∂2G
∂ω2
1
∂2G
∂ω1∂ω2
... ∂
2G
∂ω1∂ωN
∂2G
∂ω2∂ω1
∂2G
∂ω2
2
... ∂
2G
∂ω2∂ωN
...
∂2G
∂ωN∂ω1
∂2G
∂ωN∂ω2
... ∂
2G
∂ω2
N


(75)
11See equation (4.44) on page 162
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To prove the lemma, it suffices to show that the Hessian ∇2G is positive semidefinite. We need to
show that all the principal minors of ∇2G in (76) are nonnegative.
∇2G =
ω1 ωN µ
ω1
...
ωN
µ


∂2G
∂ω2
1
... ∂
2G
∂ω1∂ωN
∂2G
∂ω1∂µ
... ...
∂2G
∂ωN∂ω1
... ∂
2G
∂ω2
N
∂2G
∂ωN∂µ
∂2G
∂µ∂ω1
... ∂
2G
∂µ∂ωN
∂2G
∂µ2


(76)
However, because we already know that all the principal minors of the matrix in (75) are nonnega-
tive, it only remains to show that ∂
2G
∂µ2
≥ 0 and det∇2G ≥ 0.
First, we show that ∂
2G
∂µ2
≥ 0
Find the first derivative of G.
∂G
∂µ
= ln
(
N∑
i=1
θie
ωi
µ
)
+ µ
∑N
i=1 θi
−ωi
µ2
e
ωi
µ∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
= ln
(
N∑
i=1
θie
ωi
µ
)
−
1
µ
∑N
i=1 θiωie
ωi
µ∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
(77)
Find the second derivative of G.
∂2G
∂µ2
=
∑N
i=1 θi
−ωi
µ2
e
ωi
µ∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
+
1
µ2
∑N
i=1 θiωie
ωi
µ∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
−
1
µ
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
∑N
i=1 θi
−ω2i
µ2
e
ωi
µ −
∑N
i=1 θi
−ωi
µ2
e
ωi
µ
∑N
i=1 θiωie
ωi
µ[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2 (78)
∂2G
∂µ2
=
1
µ
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
∑N
i=1 θi
ω2i
µ2
e
ωi
µ −
∑N
i=1 θi
ωi
µ2
e
ωi
µ
∑N
i=1 θiωie
ωi
µ[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2
=
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
∑N
i=1 θiω
2
i e
ωi
µ −
[∑N
i=1 θiωie
ωi
µ
]2
µ3
[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2 (79)
The denominator of (79) is positive. Hence, it only remains to show that the numerator is nonneg-
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ative. This part can be shown by using a Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
N∑
i=1
(√
θie
ωi
µ
)2 N∑
i=1
(√
θiω2i e
ωi
µ
)2
≥
[
N∑
i=1
√
θie
ωi
µ ·
√
θiω2i e
ωi
µ
]2
(80)
∴ ∂
2G
∂µ2
is always nonnegative.
Second, we show that det∇2G ≥ 0.
From (77), we calculate ∂
2G
∂ωk∂µ
where k ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
∂2G
∂ωk∂µ
=
∂
∂ωk
[
ln
(
N∑
i=1
θie
ωi
µ
)
−
1
µ
∑N
i=1 θiωie
ωi
µ∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]
=
θk
1
µ
e
ωk
µ∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
−
1
µ
(∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
)
· ∂
∂ωk
θkωke
ωk
µ − θk
µ
e
ωk
µ
(∑N
i=1 θiωie
ωi
µ
)
[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2
=
θk
1
µ
e
ωk
µ∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
−
1
µ
(∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
)(
θke
ωk
µ + θkωk
µ
e
ωk
µ
)
− θk
µ
e
ωk
µ
(∑N
i=1 θiωie
ωi
µ
)
[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2
=
θk
1
µ
e
ωk
µ∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
−
θke
ωk
µ + θkωk
µ
e
ωk
µ
µ
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
+
θke
ωk
µ
(∑N
i=1 θiωie
ωi
µ
)
µ2
[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2
= −
θkωke
ωk
µ
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
µ2
[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2 + θke
ωk
µ
(∑N
i=1 θiωie
ωi
µ
)
µ2
[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2
=
θke
ωk
µ
(∑N
i=1 θiωie
ωi
µ − ωk
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
)
µ2
[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2
=
θke
ωk
µ
∑N
i=1 θi (ωi − ωk) e
ωi
µ
µ2
[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2 (81)
Similarly,
∂G
∂ωk
=
∂
∂ωk
µ ln
(
N∑
i=1
θie
ωi
µ
)
= µ
θk
1
µ
e
ωk
µ∑N
i=1 θ¯ie
ωi
µ
=
θke
ωk
µ∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
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∂2G
∂ω2k
=
∂
∂ωk
θke
ωk
µ∑N
i=1 θ¯ie
ωi
µ
=
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ · θk
µ
e
ωk
µ − θke
ωk
µ · θk
µ
e
ωk
µ[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2
= θke
ωk
µ
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ − θke
ωk
µ
µ
[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2
Provided that j, k ∈ {1, ..., N} and j 6= k,
∂2G
∂ωj∂ωk
=
∂
∂ωj
θke
ωk
µ∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
=
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ · 0− θke
ωk
µ 1
µ
θje
ωj
µ[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2
= −
1
µ
θkθj[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2 eωkµ eωjµ
Thus, ∇2G·,k in (82) shows the kth column of ∇
2G. ∇2G·,1 denotes the first column, ∇
2G·,2 denotes
the second column, and so forth.
∇2G·,k =


∂2G
∂ω1∂ωk
...
∂2G
∂ω2
k
...
∂2G
∂ωN∂ωk
∂2G
∂µ∂ωk


=


− θ1θke
ωk
µ e
ω1
µ
µ
{∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
}2
...
θke
ωk
µ
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ −θke
ωk
µ
µ
{∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
}2
...
− θNθke
ωk
µ e
ωN
µ
µ
{∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
}2
θke
ωk
µ
∑N
i=1 θi(ωi−ωk)e
ωi
µ
µ2
{∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
}2


=
θke
ωk
µ
µ
{∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
}2


−θ1e
ω1
µ
...∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ − θke
ωk
µ
...
−θNe
ωN
µ
1
µ
∑N
i=1 θi (ωi − ωk) e
ωi
µ


(82)
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Consider the following linear combination of the columns.
N∑
k=1
ωk
µ
∇2G·,k =
N∑
k=1
ωk
µ


∂2G
∂ω1∂ωk
...
∂2G
∂ω2
k
...
∂2G
∂ωN∂ωk
∂2G
∂µ∂ωk


=
N∑
k=1
θkωke
ωk
µ
µ2
{∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
}2


−θ1e
ω1
µ
...∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ − θke
ωk
µ
...
−θNe
ωN
µ
1
µ
∑N
i=1 θi (ωi − ωk) e
ωi
µ


=
1
µ2
{∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
}2


θ1ω1e
ω1
µ
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ − θ1e
ω1
µ
∑N
k=1 θkωke
ωk
µ
...
θ
N
ω
N
e
ω
N
µ
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ − θNe
ω
N
µ
∑N
k=1 θkωke
ωk
µ
1
µ
∑N
k=1
{
θkωke
ωk
µ
∑N
i=1 θi (ωi − ωk) e
ωi
µ
}


=
1
µ2
{∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
}2


θ1e
ω1
µ
{∑N
i=1 ω1θie
ωi
µ −
∑N
k=1 θkωke
ωk
µ
}
...
θ
N
ω
N
{∑N
i=1 ωNθie
ωi
µ −
∑N
k=1 θkωke
ωk
µ
}
1
µ
∑N
k=1
{
θkωke
ωk
µ
(∑N
i=1 θiωie
ωi
µ − ωk
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
)}


N∑
k=1
ωk
µ
∇2G·,k
=
1
µ2
{∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
}2


θ1e
ω1
µ
∑N
k=1 θk (ω1 − ωk) e
ωk
µ
...
θ
N
ω
N
∑N
k=1 θk (ωN − ωk) e
ωk
µ
1
µ
[{∑N
k=1 θkωke
ωk
µ
}2
−
{∑N
k=1 θke
ωk
µ
}{∑N
k=1 θkω
2
ke
ωk
µ
}]


(83)
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However, the last column of ∇2G is
∇2G·N+1 =


∂2G
∂ω1∂µ
∂2G
∂ω2∂µ
...
∂2G
∂ωN∂µ
∂2G
∂µ2


=
1
µ2
[∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
]2


θ1e
ω1
µ
∑N
i=1 θi (ωi − ω1) e
ωi
µ
θ2e
ω2
µ
∑N
i=1 θi (ωi − ω2) e
ωi
µ
...
θNe
ωN
µ
∑N
i=1 θi (ωi − ωN ) e
ωi
µ
1
µ
∑N
i=1 θie
ωi
µ
∑N
i=1 θiω
2
i e
ωi
µ − 1
µ
[∑N
i=1 θiωie
ωi
µ
]2


(84)
The combination of (83) and (84) yields (85).
N∑
k=1
ωk
µ
∇2G·,k +∇
2G·N+1 =


0
0
...
0
0


(85)
Therefore,
det∇2G = det
[
∇2G·,1 ∇
2G·,2 ... ∇
2G·,N ∇
2G·,N+1
]
= det
[
∇2G·,1 ∇
2G·,2 ... ∇
2G·,N
∑N
k=1
ωk
µ
∇2G·,k +∇
2G·N+1
]
= det
[
∇2G·,1 ∇
2G·,2 ... ∇
2G·,N 0
]
= 0 (86)
Because both ∂
2G
∂µ2
and det∇2G are nonnegative, G is a convex function.
(9) is a convex optimization problem because both the objective function and the feasible set
are convex.
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8.6 The Proof of Theorem 3
Note from our pseudo-code that the number of times we need to solve the problem (27) is ΠKk=1nk
ΠKk=1nk ≤ Π
K
k=1J = J
K (87)
In addition, it is well known that, in principle, the interior-point method can solve any convex
optimization in polynomial time of the problem dimension. Thus, (27) should also be solvable in
polynomial time. Let τ(ℓ1, ℓ2, ..., ℓK) denote the time required to solve problem (27).
Let T denote the time required to execute the entire pseudo-code.
T =
n1∑
ℓ1=1
n2∑
ℓ2=1
...
nK∑
ℓK=1
τ(ℓ1, ℓ2, ...ℓK) ≤ J
K max
ℓ1,ℓ2,...,ℓK
τ(ℓ1, ℓ2, ...ℓK)
max
ℓ1,ℓ2,...,ℓK
τ(ℓ1, ℓ2, ...ℓK) is bounded above by a polynomial function of J . Thus, T is also bounded
above by a polynomial of J .
8.7 Other Well-Known Strengths of the Pari-mutuel Auction
Please see Baron and Lange (2007) or Lange and Economide (2005) for a more thorough discussion.
In this subsection, we briefly introduce some of the strengths of pari-mutuel auctions and our
insights.
8.7.1 Liquidity Aggregation
The market maker can reduce his/her inventory holding cost by being involved in more than one
market. This lower inventory holding cost allows the market maker to supply liquidity to each
market at lower cost.
To illustrate, consider an exotic derivative market with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as the
underlying variable. Suppose that there are two types of options: a call option with the strike 0%
and a put option with the same strike. For example, if the CPI is 1%, the call option pays $1, while
the put option does not pay. Imagine that there is an overwhelming demand for both options.
First, consider the case in which two markets are fragmented. There is one dealer for each
market. Overwhelming demand for each option forces the market maker to take a large short
position. The inventory of each market maker becomes highly unbalanced, exposing him/her to
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significant risk. This increased inventory cost leads to a larger bid-ask spread and reduced liquidity
in each market (Stoll, 1978).
In contrast, consider having a common market maker serve both markets. Simultaneously
taking large short positions in both the call option and put options is less risky than shorting only
one option. As the underlying variable fluctuates, the price of the call and that of the put move in
the opposite direction. Therefore, holding the call option can partly offset the risk of holding the
put option and vice versa. A smaller inventory holding cost leads to a narrower bid-ask spread and
enhanced liquidity in each market.
This effect is called ”liquidity aggregation” because it is as if the common market maker is
aggregating scarce liquidity from each market into the common pool (Lange and Economide, 2005;
Baron and Lange, 2007).
The ability to aggregate liquidity is particularly important in introducing a new and innovative
derivatives market (Shiller, 2008). One important reason is that there is a strong network externality
effect when organizing a financial market (Stoll, 1992). People want to trade at a place where other
people also tend to trade (Stoll, 1992; Shiller, 2008). Thus, it is difficult for the new market
to gather a sufficient number of participants above a certain threshold to ensure smooth market
operation (Shiller, 2008). In this respect, Robert Shiller notes that pari-mutuel auctions can serve
as the springboard for new markets (Baron and Lange 2007). This approach can help new markets
aggregate sufficient liquidity to compete with previously established markets (Baron and Lange,
2007).
8.7.2 Price Efficiency
Pari-mutuel mechanisms enhance price efficiency because information flows from one market to
another through the common market maker (Baron and Lange, 2007). Prices of options with the
same underlying asset or variable are closely related to one another. Hence, information in one
market is relevant to the pricing of other options. Therefore, a common market maker is more
efficient than market makers involved only in a single fragmented market. The common market
maker can use information in multiple related markets when pricing each security.
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9 Images and Tables
The files for images and tables used in this paper can be found at:
https://sites.google.com/site/heesurohacademics/marketmaking
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